A Better Way to Generate and Use Comparative-Effectiveness Research by Michael F. Cannon
President Barack Obama, former U.S. Senate
majority leader TomDaschle, and others propose
anewgovernment agency thatwould evaluate the
relative effectiveness of medical treatments. The
need for “comparative-effectiveness research” is
great. Evidence suggests Americans spend $700
billion annually onmedical care that provides no
value. Yet patients, providers, and purchasers typ-
ically lack the necessary information to distin-
guish between high- and low-value services.
Advocates of such an agency argue that com-
parative-effectiveness information has character-
istics of a “public good,” therefore markets will
not generate the efficiency-maximizing quantity.
While that is correct, economic theory does not
conclude that government should provide com-
parative-effectiveness research, nor that govern-
ment provision would increase social welfare.
Conservatives warn that a federal compara-
tive-effectiveness agency would lead to govern-
ment rationing of medical care—indeed, that’s
the whole idea. If history is any guide, the more
likely outcome is that the agency would be com-
pletely ineffective: political pressure from the
industry will prevent the agency from conduct-
ing useful research and prevent purchasers
from using such research to eliminate low-value
care.
The current lack of comparative-effectiveness
research is due more to government failure than
to market failure. Federal tax and entitlement
policies reduce consumer demand for such
research. Those policies, as well as state licensing
of health insurance and medical professionals,
inhibit the types of health plans best equipped to
generate comparative-effectiveness information.
A better way to generate comparative-effective-
ness information would be for Congress to elimi-
nate government activities that suppress private
production. Congress should let workers and
Medicare enrollees control the money that pur-
chases their health insurance. Further, Congress
should require states to recognize other states’
licenses for medical professionals and insurance
products. That laissez-faire approach would both
increase comparative-effectiveness research and
increase the likelihood that patients andproviders
would use it.
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Introduction
Economists describe medicine as a “cre-
dence good” because patients have difficulty
judging its value even after consuming it, and
therefore must rely on the advice of doctors,
who knowmore about such things.1 Yet doc-
tors themselves frequently have difficulty
making accurate judgments about the quali-
ty of their services, both before and after they
have provided them. Doctors (and nurses,
pharmaceutical manufacturers, etc.) may
think they were responsible for a good out-
come, or not responsible for a bad outcome,
but it is often impossible to know for sure.
That uncertainty guarantees that patients
will receive some services that provide little or
no value, and even some services that prove
harmful.
A growing body of evidence suggests that
the problem of low-value medical care is
much larger than it need be—that Americans
spend hundreds of billions of dollars each
year on medical care that delivers no value—
and that many of those expenditures could
be identified and eliminated without harm-
ing health or reducing patient satisfaction.
Much of that evidence comes from Medi-
care, the federal health insurance program for
the elderly and disabled, which is the single
largest purchaser ofmedical care in the nation.
Examining Medicare records, researchers have
found that per-beneficiary spending varies
widely fromoneareaof thecountry to thenext.
In some areas, Medicare spends twice as much
per senior as it does in other areas. Researchers
have also found that beneficiaries in high-
spending areas do not start out sicker, do not
end up healthier, and are no happier with the
care they receive, than beneficiaries in low-
spending areas.2 That suggests that a signifi-
cant amount of Medicare spending provides
no discernible benefit to the program’s intend-
ed beneficiaries. Those researchers estimate
thatasmuchas30percentof totalU.S.medical
spending provides no discernible value.3 If so,
then Americans spend more than $700 bil-
lion each year, or 5 percent of gross domestic
product, on medical services of no discernible
value.4
Data on the relative effectiveness of differ-
ent modes of care can reduce uncertainty and
help purchasers, providers, and patients avoid
unnecessary expenditures.5 Research shows
there is much less variation in medical spend-
ing when there is a consensus about the best
course of treatment.6
Unfortunately, current institutions appear
to underprovide such data. In terms of med-
ical interventions, estimates of the share of
existing interventions that have a solid evi-
dence base vary, though many researchers
believe the share is “well below half.”7 David
Eddy, a leading advocate of evidence-based
medicine, estimates the share tobeas lowas15
percent.8 In terms of overallmedical spending,
the Institute of Medicine estimates that “less
than 0.1 percent is invested in assessing the
comparative effectiveness of available inter-
ventions.”9 That seems small relative to the
estimated 30 percent of expenditures lost to
services of no discernible value. As discussed
below, a number of government activities
reduce incentives for private entities to gener-
ate comparative-effectiveness research, provid-
ing further reason to believe that the current
level of spending on such research is subopti-
mal.
In theory, additional spending on com-
parative-effectiveness research could pay for
itself by reducing spending on low-value ser-
vices. To that end,many policymakers seek to
boost the production of comparative-effec-
tiveness research.
Comparative-effectiveness information has
characteristics of a “public good.” Economists
argue that markets often do not generate the
efficiency-maximizing quantity of such goods.
Many observers therefore propose creating a
new federal agency devoted to generating com-
parative-effectiveness research, on the assump-
tion that doing so would improve economic
efficiency.10 For example, the Medicare Mod-
ernizationActof2003provides funding for the
Agency forHealthcareResearch andQuality to
conduct comparative-effectiveness research rel-
evant to Medicare, Medicaid, and the State
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Children’s Health Insurance Program. Recent
proposals to expand SCHIPwould create such
an agency.11 President Barack Obama pro-
posed a comparative-effectiveness agency dur-
ing his campaign.12 Former U.S. Senatemajor-
ity leader Tom Daschle proposes a “Federal
Health Board” that would conduct such
research and use it to make coverage deci-
sions.13
The case for government provision of pub-
lic goods in general, and comparative-effec-
tiveness research in particular, is not so clear-
cut. This paper examines the factors that
determine whether government provision of
comparative-effectiveness research would
increase economic efficiency. It also examines
state and federal policies that discourage the
private generation of such information, and
that block its use. Finally, it suggests reforms
that would encourage the private sector to
produce more comparative-effectiveness
research and develop innovative ways of over-
coming the public-goods problem.
The Public-Goods Problem
Economists define public goods as those
that are nonexcludable and nonrivalrous in
consumption. A good is nonexcludable if
producers cannot exclude nonpaying con-
sumers from enjoying it, and nonrivalrous in
consumption if one consumer can enjoy it
without diminishing others’ ability to enjoy
it. Classic examples of public goods include
national defense and fireworks displays.
Unlikemost goods,markets have difficulty
producing the efficiency-maximizing quantity
of public goods due to the free-rider problem.
For example, fireworks displays are nonex-
cludable, since anyone who can look skyward
can enjoy them without paying. As a result,
many will effectively free ride on the fireworks
displays purchased by others. If pyrotechni-
cians could exclude nonpayers, those free rid-
ers would have to pay in order to watch. With
that additional revenue, the pyrotechnicians
could then produce more (and more impres-
sive) fireworks displays.
Economic theory does not suggest that
markets will provide no public goods. Some
people are willing to pay for fireworks dis-
plays. Markets also devise innovative strate-
gies for boosting production of nonexclud-
able goods, such as bundling them with
excludable goods. Examples include the fol-
lowing:
• Lobbying groups face a free-rider prob-
lem because legislative victories that
benefit members also may benefit non-
members. Lobbying groups get around
that problem by bundling additional
(excludable) services, such as insurance
and information, with (nonexcludable)
lobbying services.14
• Broadcast television and radio signals
are often nonexcludable. Broadcasters
get around the free-rider problem by
bundling their nonexcludable program-
ming with advertisements, which offer
an excludable benefit to advertisers.
• Though charitable contributions and
medical research have public-good char-
acteristics, corporations and philan-
thropists can “purchase” an excludable
reputation for compassion and civic-
mindedness by donating to such causes.
“Nodoubt,”writes Pulitzer Prize-winning
sociologist Paul Starr, “the Rockefellers
3
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1. Clinical effectiveness “Does Treatment Awork?”
2. Comparative effectiveness “Does Treatment Awork better than Treatment B?”
3. Cost-effectiveness “Treatment Aworks better and costs more than Treatment B.
Is the added benefit worth the added cost?”
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sought to gainpublic credit andgoodwill
by supporting research approved bymed-
ical authorities.”15
• Countless runners participate in road
races (e.g., the Susan G. Komen Race for
the Cure) for amusement and exercise,
only to see their entrance fees donated
to charities they otherwise might not
have supported. The firms sponsoring
those races probably would not have
given as generously to those charities
had their donations not also purchased
them advertising and goodwill.
Markets increase the quantity of nonexclud-
able goods (lobbying, research, charity), be-
yond the amount that people are willing to
purchase directly, by bundling them with
excludable goods (insurance, advertising,
reputation, recreation).
Insofar as producers can exclude nonpay-
ing consumers, markets can further increase
production of public goods toward the effi-
ciency-maximizing level. Consumer Reports
generates information on the quality of con-
sumer goods. The organization excludes
nonpayers, albeit imperfectly, bymaking that
information available only to subscribers
who pay a fee. The better Consumer Reports
can exclude nonpayers—that is, the better
they can collect money from the people who
use their research—the more research they
can produce.
Lobbying groups also try to get around the
free-rider problem by excluding nonmembers
from enjoying the benefits of legislative victo-
ries. Nobel Prize-winning economist George
Stigler argues that if free riders “are not repre-
sented in the coalition, they may find that
their cheap ride is to a destination they do not
favor. The proposed tariff structure may
neglect their products; the research program
may neglect their processes; the labor negotia-
tionmay ignore their special labor mix.”16
Markets create incentives for private
actors to overcome the challenges posed by
public goods. Innovators who develop ways
to solve the free-rider problem can capture
the money that others leave on the table.
Is Government
the Solution?
Health economist and former Medicare
administratorGailWilenskywrites, “Economic
theory argues that goods or services that meet
this [public-good] definition will be underpro-
duced by the private sector and should there-
fore be financed by government.”17 Wilensky’s
first claim is correct; the second is not. A
descriptive science, economics makes no value
judgments or normative statements about
what government should do. Economic theory
no more argues that government should pro-
vide public goods than nuclear physics argues
that government should build atomic bombs.
Economic theory can tell us whether govern-
ment provision of public goods would increase
efficiency. It goes no further.
And it may not even go that far. Despite
many confident assertions that government
provision of public goods increases efficiency,
economic theory is equivocal on thatquestion.
Government provision suffers from the same
free-rider problem that markets do, and cre-
ates additional problems associated with the
excess burden of taxation, politicization, and
crowd-out of private provision. (The appendix
offers a graphic explanation of the economics
of public goods under both market and gov-
ernment provision.) Moreover, even if govern-
ment provision would improve economic effi-
ciency, theremay be other competing values at
stake.
The object of government provision of pub-
lic goods is to increase efficiency by boosting
quantity fromthemarket-supplied level toward
the efficiency-maximizing level. Like the mar-
ket, government faces a challenge in determin-
ing that optimal quantity. Government could
try to approximate that quantity by askingpeo-
ple howmuch they value a public good, taxing
peopleaccordingtotheirpreferences, andusing
the revenue to fund production. However, gov-
ernment also encounters a free-rider problem:
individuals could try to reduce their own tax
burden by pretending not to value such
research, hoping instead to free ride on the
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research “purchased” by those who honestly
reveal their preferences. Nobel Prize–winning
economist Paul Samuelson explains:
One could imagine every person in the
community being indoctrinated to
behave like a “parametric decentralized
bureaucrat” who reveals his preferences
by signaling in response to price para-
meters . . . to questionnaires, or to other
devices. But . . . by departing from his
indoctrinated rules, any one person can
hope to snatch some selfish benefit.18
In other words, government is no better
equipped than the market to determine the
“right” amount of a public good. The effi-
ciency-maximizing quantity is unknown and
unknowable.19 The market may produce less
than the efficiency-maximizing quantity, but
governmentmight produce less ormore than
that amount—either of which would involve
economic losses.
At the same time, government faces unique
challenges. Government spending on public
goods incurs what economists call the “excess
burden” of taxation, or the reduction in eco-
nomicoutput that results from increasing tax-
es. The excess burden imposes real costs on
society. Some economists estimate that due to
the excess burden, it may cost society more
than two dollars to raise just one additional
dollar of government revenue.20 The excess
burden therefore couldmake theactual costof
government-provided public goods as much
as twice the apparent cost, and (all else being
equal) twice asmuchas the costofmarketpro-
vision. By increasing the marginal cost of pro-
ducing public goods, the excess burden also
reduces the optimal quantity. That shift
reduces the potential gains from government
provision and makes it more likely that gov-
ernmentwould boost productionbeyond that
quantity (see Appendix).
Unlike markets, government decisions
about providing public goods must pass
through the political process, where small
groups with an intense interest in the out-
come can override the will of a disinterested
majority. Mancur Olson observes:
The small oligopolistic industry seek-
ing a tariff or a tax loophole will some-
times attain its objective even if the vast
majority of the population loses as a
result. The smaller groups . . . can often
defeat the large groups . . . which are
normally supposed to prevail in a
democracy . . . because the former are
generally organized and active while
the latter are normally unorganized
and inactive.21
Particularly well-organized and effective
interest groups could conceivably boost the
quantity of a government-provided public
good beyond the (new, lower) efficiency-
maximizing level, which would create eco-
nomic losses.
More likely, however, such groups could
obtain government funding for public goods
that they otherwise would have funded
themselves. Insofar as government provision
“crowds out” market provision, that too
imposes losses on society. Society must pay
not just the cost of those public goods, but
also the excess burden of the taxes required
to have government provide them.
For governmentprovisionof apublic good
to increase efficiency, (a) the gains from any
net increase in supply must outweigh (b) the
losses stemming from the excess burden of
the taxes needed to fund any crowded out
public goods (which the market would have
supplied anyway), plus (c) the losses stemming
from any quantity supplied in excess of the
new efficiency-maximizing level. Since it is
unknown whether the gains from (a) would
outweigh the losses from (b) and (c), it is the-
oretically ambiguous whether government
provision of public goods will increase or
reduce economic efficiency.
Finally, economic efficiency is only one
among many values, such as liberty and the
rule of law. For government provision to be
desirable, economic efficiencymust trump any
conflicting values. For example, federal provi-
sion of many public goods conflicts with the
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rule of law because the U.S. Constitution
grants Congress the power to provide or pro-
mote only specific public goods. Those include
“the common Defence” and “the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.” Moreover, the Con-
stitution specifically enumerates the powers
granted to provide or promote those public
goods—such as the power “To raise and sup-
port Armies” and the power of “securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusiveRight to their respectiveWritings and
Discoveries.”22 The Constitution’s silence with
regard to other public goods indicates that the
peoplehavenot grantedCongress thepower to
provide them.23 That conclusion is reinforced
by the Tenth Amendment: “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution . . . are reserved to the States respective-
ly, or to the people.”24 To argue that Congress
should provide such public goods anyway is to
argue that economic efficiency is more impor-
tant than the rule of law.
What about
Comparative-Effectiveness
Information?
Government provision of comparative-
effectiveness information may do little or
nothing to increase efficiency compared to a
policy of laissez faire. As suggested above,mar-
kets already create incentives for private actors
to produce comparative-effectiveness infor-
mation. Producers frequently can exclude
nonpayers from using that information. Even
when producers do not exclude nonpayers,
markets boost production by bundling com-
parative-effectiveness information with ex-
cludable goods. Finally, government provision
would be particularly susceptible to political
manipulation andwould crowdoutmuchpri-
vate research.
Market Provision
Marketsdoprovidesomecomparative-effec-
tiveness information despite its public-good
characteristics. Private firms such as the Blue
Cross Blue Shield Association’s Technology
Evaluation Center, Hayes, Inc.; the ECRI
Institute; the Tufts–New England Medical
Center; the HMO Research Network; and
InfoPOEMs gather and compile such informa-
tion for those willing to purchase it.25 More
important, the Congressional Budget Office
notes that “private health plans—most com-
monly larger ormore integratedones—conduct
their own reviews of evidence and sometimes
undertake new analyses of comparative effectiveness
using claims data for their enrollees.”26
To some extent, producers of compara-
tive-effectiveness information can exclude
nonpaying consumers. In its discussion of
private health plans that generate and com-
pile such research, the CBO writes:
Health plans may choose to publicize
the results, or they may decide to keep
their findings confidential and use
them to shape their policies regarding
coverage of and payment for the treat-
ments in question. For example, health
plans usually have an entity known as a
pharmacy and therapeutic committee
that considers the evidence regarding
the relative effectiveness of different
prescription drugs and makes recom-
mendations about which ones should
be covered (that is, included on formu-
laries) or given preferred status.27
The better that health plans become at exclud-
ing (and the more they choose to exclude)
nonpayers, the closer the market-supplied
quantity of comparative-effectiveness research
will come to the efficiency-maximizing quan-
tity, and the less likely it is that government
provision would improve efficiency.
Markets also bundle comparative-effec-
tiveness information with excludable goods.
Wealthy individuals and charitable founda-
tions may fund such research not only
because they value the expected health gains
but also to purchase a reputation for altru-
ism or civic-mindedness. Universities and
budding scholars likewise perform such
research to enhance their academic reputa-
tions.28
6
Government
provision of
comparative-
effectiveness
information
may do little or
nothing to
increase efficiency
compared to a
policy of laissez
faire.
360451_PA632_1stClass:3603_PA632_1stClass  2/6/2009  3:44 PM  Page 6
Most important, private health plans may
gainanadvantageovercompetitorsbygaininga
reputation forgenerating comparative-effective-
nessresearch.Forexample,KaiserPermanente is
a leader in the field of comparative-effectiveness
research (see below). In effect, Kaiser purchases
anexcludable reputationforqualityby investing
in less-excludable comparative-effectiveness
research. Such bundling strategies resemble the
“private clubs” approach to public-goods provi-
sionexpoundedbyNobelPrize–winningecono-
mist James Buchanan,29 and further push the
market-supplied quantity toward the efficiency-
maximizing quantity.
Government Provision: Politicization
Unlikemarket-generated research, a federal
comparative-effectiveness agency would be
subject to politicalmanipulation,which could
block the generation of any useful research.
The purpose of comparative-effectiveness
research is todemonstratewhichmodesof care
provide value to patients and which do not. If
it is to be at all useful, such research necessarily
poses a direct threat to the incomes of phar-
maceutical manufacturers, medical device
manufacturers, and millions of providers. If a
government agency produces unwelcome
research, those groupswill spend vast sums on
lobbying campaigns and political contribu-
tions to discredit or defund the agency.
Industry groups have done so repeatedly.30
Congress created the congressional Office of
Technology Assessment in 1972 and the execu-
tive-branch National Center for Health Care
Technology in 1978, charging both agencies
with assessing the effectiveness ofmedical tech-
nologies. Induecourse,bothagenciesproduced
research that offended the health care industry.
According to John Eisenberg and Deborah
Zarin of the former Agency for Health Care
Policy andResearch, industry opposition led to
the elimination of the National Center for
HealthCareTechnology in1981,andtheOffice
of Technology Assessment in 1995. Eisenberg
and Zarin continue:
In1984Congress created theCouncilon
Health Care Technology [which] con-
ducted assessments of only two tech-
nologies—the artificial heart and end-
stage renal dialysis—before it expired in
1989. Again, the voices of organized
medicine and thedruganddevice indus-
tries were influential in achieving
CHCT’s demise.31
In 1995, AHCPR produced an unflattering
assessment of the efficacy of many back surg-
eries. Back surgeons and the medical-device
manufacturer Sofamor Danek stood to suffer
financially, and nearly succeeded in defunding
the agency. Instead, Congress cut AHCPR’s
budget by a mere 21 percent.32 According to
authorShannonBrownlee, the retributionsdid
not end there: “The AHCPR was given a new
name, theAgency forHealthCareResearchand
Quality, and stripped of its authority to recom-
mend payment decisions to Medicare and
Medicaid.”33 The agency got themessage. After
1995, it abandonedcontroversial researchactiv-
ities that were likely very useful.34 AHRQnever-
theless fell underpolitical attack again. In2002,
theHouseofRepresentativesvotedtoeliminate
AHRQ’s funding, though the agency ultimate-
ly survived.35
Princeton economist Uwe Reinhardt argues
that “AHRQ’sdisturbinghistory andcontinued
precarious existence has shown [that a similar]
approach wouldmake [a comparative-effective-
ness agency] vulnerable to lobbying by interest
groups, because one or a few members of
Congress could easily imperil the [agency’s] exis-
tence through the appropriations process.”36
The United Kingdom’s National Institute for
Clinical Evaluation and Excellence is likewise
under constant assault from the industry and
individual patients.37 Even if a federal compara-
tive-effectiveness agency temporarily survives
the inevitable industry-led assaults, its contin-
ued existence, its ability to produce useful
research, and its influence on medical practice
will be highly uncertain.
Supporters acknowledge the problem
that political pressure creates for the agenda,
credibility, and survival of a federal compara-
tive-effectiveness agency.38 They therefore
propose various approaches to insulate the
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agency from political influence, none of
which is likely to be effective. Daschle would
model the agency on the Federal Reserve
Board, which many believe to be insulated
from political influence.39 Yet according to
economist Allan H. Meltzer, the author of a
two-volume history of the Fed, the Federal
Reserve Board’s mythic reputation for inde-
pendence is undeserved:
We talk about an independent Federal
Reserve, but in reading and writing the
history of the Federal Reserve, there are
very few occasions since the 1930s
when the Fed actually practiced inde-
pendence. . . . [current chairman Ben]
Bernanke is anything but an indepen-
dent central bank governor. He is being
leaned on by the Congress, and he
accedes to them. . . . In reading themin-
utes of the Fed andwatchingwhat they
do, the Fed has always been very much
afraid of Congress. . . . The idea of hav-
ing a really independent agency in
Washington, that’s just not going to
happen. . . . The Federal Reserve derives
its power from Congress. . . . The Fed’s
power is delegated, and they are very
much aware that Congress could
always change that.40
Other presumably independent federal agen-
cies, such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission, face similar pressures.41 Politi-
cizationappearsnot to imperil the existenceof
the Fed or the SEC, perhaps because those
agencies have “customers” whose support is
broad and deep enough to protect the agen-
cies from political attacks by disaffected
groups. In contrast, experience suggests that
government agencies conducting compara-
tive-effectiveness research do not have an ade-
quate counterbalance to attacks by the indus-
try.
Some supporters argue that a dedicated,
mandatory funding source would provide
more stable funding than annual appropria-
tions. Proposals would variously tax pharma-
ceutical expenditures,42 private health plans
and employers,43 or allmedical expenditures.44
But as MedPAC writes, “an agency that relies
on suchamandatory funding sourcewouldbe
accountable to policymakers because
Congress always has the option to alter or end
its funding.”45
Whatever structure Congress gives to a fed-
eral comparative-effectiveness agency, the
industry will ultimately convince Congress of
what the late Sen. William Proxmire enjoyed
reminding his colleagues about the Fed: the
agency is a creature ofCongress, andCongress
may direct it at will.46 If Congress funds com-
parative-effectiveness research, politics will
govern that research, imperil its existence, and
limit its usefulness.
Conservatives warn that a federal compar-
ative-effectiveness agency would lead to gov-
ernment rationing of medical care.47 Indeed,
that’s the whole idea. Ironically, the more
likely outcome is that the agency will be com-
pletely ineffective. Compounding that irony,
government provision of comparative-effec-
tiveness research enables opponents, such as
the back surgeons and their Republican
allies, to cast their opposition as an effort to
limit government—even as they guarantee
greater government spending on low-value
medical care.
Government Provision: Crowd-Out
Moreover, it is likely that much of the
comparative-effectiveness research actually
funded by a government agency wouldmere-
ly crowd out research that the private sector
would have funded anyway.48
To survive, a federal comparative-effective-
ness agencymust necessarily cater to the needs
of its core political constituents. When Clifton
Gaus took the helm of AHCPR in 1994, he
explained to agency staff (according to Brad-
fordGray and colleagues) “that the agency had
to consider its customers to be those who
would make use of the products of its work
and . . . onwhosegoodwill theagency’s support
would depend.”49 Gray and colleagues argue
that after the industry-led assault on AHCPR
in 1995, the agency focused evenmore intently
on its “customers”: “Recognizing the impor-
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tance of engaging in activities that are valued
by thosewhodirectly or indirectlymight affect
the agency’s resources, the agency undertook
energetic efforts to establish ongoing contacts
and liaisons to learn what activities and types
of informationmight be important, to whom,
in setting priorities.”50
The primary constituency for any federal
comparative-effectiveness agency will be pri-
vate health plans and employers. Private pur-
chasers are most likely to fund comparative-
effectiveness research on their own, and will
have the most intense interest in the funding
levels and research agenda of the agency. For
example, enthusiastic proponents of federally
funded comparative-effectiveness research
include the Blue Cross Blue Shield Associ-
ation,51 whose Technology Evaluation Center
collects and disseminates such research, and
Kaiser Permanente, a leader in generating such
research (see below).52
If a federal comparative-effectiveness agency
is to survive the inevitablepolitical attacks from
providers, it must maintain a positive relation-
shipwithprivate healthplans. As a result, those
plans would likely obtain government funding
for research they otherwise would have funded
themselves. As discussed above (and in the
Appendix), suchcrowd-out representsanet loss
for society.53
Market Failure or
Government Failure?
The current lack of comparative-effective-
ness research is due more to government fail-
ure than to market failure. For 100 years, fed-
eral and state governments have suppressed
the generation and use of comparative-effec-
tiveness research. Interventions on both the
supply and demand sides push private provi-
sion below what markets would produce in a
laissez-faire environment. Moreover, the
politicization of coverage and reimbursement
decisions prevents purchasers from using
comparative-effectiveness research, and will
limit the utility of even government-provided
research.
PGPs: An Engine of Comparative-
Effectiveness Research
In a laissez-faire environment, health plans
and providers would profit from delivering
health improvements at a lower cost than their
competitors. Competition would push plans
and providers to invest in comparative-effec-
tiveness research, because that research would
enable them to abandon unnecessary services
and find less costly ways of improving health.
Plans and providers would compete on the
basis of who generates comparative-effective-
ness information, how well they incorporate
new information into their practice styles, and
who has the best approach to deviating from
clinical guidelines when doing so is in the
patient’s interest.
As noted above, a number of private entities
currently provide comparative-effectiveness
research.Amongprivatehealthplans, however,
integratedprepaid groupplans (PGPs), such as
Kaiser Permanente and Group Health Coop-
erative, appear to be uniquely suited to gener-
ate and deploy comparative-effectiveness
research. Those plans are integrated in the
sense that all the doctors and other clinicians
generally work for the same corporate entity.
They are “prepaid” in the sense that the insur-
ance carrier is also part of the same corporate
entity, thus the enrollees’ premiums more or
less comprise the providers’ entire budget for
the year. In contrast, most Americans receive
medical care from a fragmented collection of
providers whose incomes rise with the volume
of services they provide.
The combination of integration and pre-
payment uniquely gives PGPs the incentive
and the means to generate and use compara-
tive-effectiveness information. Prepayment
ensures that if a health plan delivers low- or
zero-value services, the cost comes directly out
of the health plan’s bottom line. PGPs there-
fore face enormous financial incentives to
conduct research that will enable them to dis-
tinguish high-value from low-value services.
Integration gives PGPs the means to mea-
sure effectiveness by tracking all services
received by their enrollees and those patients’
health outcomes. Since the mid-20th century,
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PGPs have collected and used data from
enrollees’ medical records to improve patient
care.54 PGPs were the first to develop and
deploy electronic medical records, and they
continue to lead the industry.55 For example,
one Kaiser Permanente publication boasts of
“a researchprogramwithmillionsof subjects”:
Our integrated care delivery model and
45-year history of electronic records give
us the ability to analyze and leverage
decades of data. In 2005, Kaiser
Permanente had under way or complet-
ed approximately 2,250 different re-
search projects in a number of vital
areas, including cancer, heart disease,
diabetes, women’s health, obesity, de-
pression, genetics, and disparities in
health care. . . . Our physicians and
researchers also conduct clinical trials of
new drugs, medical devices, behavioral
interventions, and other therapies.56
When federal Food and Drug Administration
reviewer David J. Graham sought to establish
whether the anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx
(generic name: rofecoxib) increases the risk of
serious coronary heart disease, he turned to
Kaiser Permanente. Their study of 1.4 million
Kaiser enrollees’ medical records established
that Vioxx does increase the risk and led to the
drug’s withdrawal.57
The ability to track and measure patient
outcomes even enables PGPs to conduct ran-
domized, controlled trials of medical treat-
ments. According to researchers Raymond
Fink andMitch Greenlick:
PGP integrated information systems
also permit the generation of study and
control groups, using member files for
randomization based on personal char-
acteristics. In addition, these systems
can create matched control groups for
members identified with a target illness
in order to observe differences between
the groups over time or to study the
effect of medical interventions.58
Randomized, controlled trials are the gold
standard of medical-effectiveness research.
PGPs are also well-equipped to overcome
the public-good challenges inherent to com-
parative-effectiveness information. Investing in
comparative-effectiveness research does more
than enable a PGP to avoid low-value services;
it can earn the plan a reputation for quality. As
discussed above, PGPs therefore boost the pro-
duction of a nonexcludable good (compara-
tive-effectiveness information) by bundling it
with an excludable good (reputation). Staff-
model PGPs are alsowell-equipped to keep the
findings of their research confidential, because
clinicians generally work solely for the plan. As
discussed above, the ability to exclude nonpay-
ers will further encourage PGPs to boost com-
parative-effectiveness research toward the effi-
ciency-maximizing level.
Finally, any health plan that generates com-
parative-effectiveness research has an advan-
tage in implementing it. PGPs may have the
greatest advantage. Providers aremore likely to
resist efforts to change their practice style if
those efforts are imposedupon thembymulti-
ple and distant purchasers. When PGPs trans-
late comparative-effectiveness information
into practice guidelines, however, they do so in
collaboration with the physicians who will use
those guidelines. At aminimum, that dynamic
has the potential to reduce friction between
purchasers andproviders, and increase the like-
lihood that providers will use comparative-
effectiveness research.59 Moreover, unlike
providers who billmultiple payers, staff-model
PGPs need comply with only one set of clinical
practice guidelines, which increases the likeli-
hood that comparative-effectiveness research
will influencemedical practice.
Yet PGPs command a tiny share of the pri-
vate health insurance market—an estimated
11million Americans in 2004, or 4 percent of
the insured population.60 That is due largely
to a century’s worth of state and federal gov-
ernment interventions—often enacted at the
behest of themedical profession—which have
blocked the growth of PGPs, and with them,
the market’s ability to generate comparative-
effectiveness research.
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Suppressing Supply
Supply-side obstacles to PGPs date as far
back as the medical profession’s efforts to
eliminate prepaid practice in the early part of
the 20th century. The profession used the
powers it gained under physician licensing,
corporate-practice-of-medicine laws, and
other measures to drive integrated, prepaid
plans from the market.61 Researchers Jon
Christianson and George Avery write, “orga-
nized medicine also accused PGPs of being
under communist influence and later used
control of local health planning bodies to
deny PGPs permits to construct facilities.”62
Whether the medical profession noticed the
irony, Christianson and Avery do not say.
Licensing ofmedical professionals contin-
ues to hamper PGPs. PGPs face unique incen-
tives to employ mid-level clinicians, such as
nurse practitioners and physician assistants,
when doing so will reduce costs without sac-
rificing quality.63 According to professor of
health policy JonathanWeiner, nonphysician
clinicians comprise 14 percent of primary
care providers nationally, but 17 percent at
Kaiser Permanente and 25 percent at Group
Health.64 The scope-of-practice rules that are
part of every state’s licensing regime prevent
PGPs from employing mid-level clinicians to
their full potential.65 Licensing laws therefore
further undercut PGPs’ ability to compete on
the basis of price. Scope-of-practice rules also
vary from state to state. That variation forces
PGPs to devise new, state-specific workflows
if they seek to expand into new markets.
State insurance regulations likewise place
disproportionate burdens on PGPs. States
typically regulate PGPs and other managed
care organizations more heavily than other
insurance carriers.66 The fact that insurance
regulations vary from state to state also pos-
es an obstacle to PGPs. Though every insur-
ance carrier must contend with a new set of
regulations when expanding into a new state,
themarginal cost of compliance is greater for
PGPs because it comes on top of PGPs’
uniquely high start-up costs (e.g., acquiring
facilities, hiring a large clinician workforce,
etc.).
Finally, Medicare and other government
interventions favor fee-for-service payment
over prepayment. Fee-for-service discourages
providers from adopting the electronic med-
ical records that facilitate comparative-effec-
tiveness research.67 Medicare puts PGPs at a
market-wide disadvantage by giving providers
a highly remunerative alternative. Meanwhile,
Medicare beneficiaries’ access to PGPs has
been “highly variable,”68 rising and fallingwith
the perceived adequacy of Medicare’s pay-
ments toprivateMedicareAdvantageplans. In
January 2009, president Barack Obama pro-
posed eliminating the Medicare Advantage
program.69 That step would eliminate seniors’
access to PGPs, diminish PGPs’ ability to con-
duct comparative-effectiveness research, and
further distort the market toward fee-for-ser-
vice payment.
Suppressing Demand
Government intervention has taken away
almost any financial incentive for consumers
to demand comparative-effectiveness infor-
mation. Americans pay for only a small frac-
tion of medical services directly (13 percent).
More importantly, consumers control a sim-
ilarly small fraction of the money that pur-
chases their health insurance (15 percent).
Due to a large federal tax break for employer-
sponsored health insurance and government
health-insurance programs, employers and
government control the vast majority of the
$1.6 trillion spent on insurance schemes in
theUnited States (see Figure 1).70 Consumers
have little reason to demand comparative-
effectiveness information, because on average
they would see only 15 percent of the savings
that result from avoiding unnecessary med-
ical spending.71
According to Stanford health economist
Alain Enthoven, “less than 5 percent of the
insured workforce can both choose a health
plan and reap the full savings from choosing
economically.”72 Consumers’ indifference to
the cost of their health insurance inhibits
PGPs, whose primary advantage is that they
offer more affordable coverage,73 with appar-
ently no adverse effects on health outcomes.74
11
PGPs command a
tiny share of the
private health
insurance market
due largely to
a century’s worth
of state and
federal
government
interventions—
often enacted at
the behest of
the medical
profession.
360451_PA632_1stClass:3603_PA632_1stClass  2/6/2009  3:44 PM  Page 11
If consumers do not enjoy the premium sav-
ings, theywill seePGPsasofferingnothingbut
reduced access to services. Consumers’ lack of
cost-consciousness helped kill Kaiser
Permanente’s attempt to enter the North
Carolinamarket.75
In their role as health care purchasers,
employers and government express what lit-
tle demand remains for comparative-effec-
tiveness information. As discussed below,
however, those purchasers are ill-equipped to
make use of that information.
Suppressing Deployment
Government interventions also ensure that
whatever comparative-effectiveness informa-
tion exists will scarcely be put to use. By giving
employers control over the portion of workers’
earnings that purchases the workers’ health
insurance,76 governmentallbutguarantees that
workers will rebel when employers attempt to
use comparative-effectiveness information to
reduce unnecessary services. Themanaged care
backlash of the 1990s is a case in point.
Government is even less likely to employ
comparative-effectiveness information itself.
Since the formation of Medicare, providers
have used their political influence to prevent
Medicare from doing so. At the same time the
Medicare Modernization Act authorized new
spending for AHRQ to conduct comparative-
effectiveness research, it limited the federal
government’s ability to use that information.
The act prohibits Medicare from using that
research to deny coverage of relatively ineffec-
tive prescription drugs. The act also prohibits
Medicare from limiting payments for certain
services to that of the lowest-cost alternative
that is equally effective.77 The extent of the
industry’s ability to block the use of effective-
ness research can be seen further in the fact
that Congress forbids Medicare to use cost-
effectiveness in coverage decisions.
Reforms thatWould Promote
Comparative-Effectiveness
Research
Rather than create yet another ineffective
government agency, a better way to generate
comparative-effectiveness information would
be to undo the series of government missteps
that suppresses the market’s ability to create
and use this important research.
First and foremost, Congress should roll
back government activities that insulate con-
sumers from the cost of their health insur-
ance, as those activities reduce consumer
demand for comparative-effectiveness infor-
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Source: U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and author’s calculations.
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mation. In the Medicare program, that would
mean giving enrollees a fixed, risk-adjusted
voucher that enables them to purchase a basic
level of coverage, and letting enrollees face the
full cost of any additional benefits.78 For those
under age 65, Congress should level the play-
ing field between employer-sponsored cover-
age and other sources of health insurance,
which would make the cost of their health
insurance more apparent to workers. With a
level playing field, markets would return to
workers the portion of their earnings that
employers currently control—butonlyover the
long term. Congress should therefore endeav-
or to give workers more immediate control
over those dollars.79
Those reforms would allow workers to cap-
ture 100 percent of the savings from eliminat-
ing low- and zero-value medical care. They
would therefore give an enormousboost to the
demand for comparative-effectiveness infor-
mation, and to the health plans that generate
and use it. Those reforms would also reduce
the health care industry’s ability to block the
generation and use of such information.
Second, Congress should eliminate the reg-
ulatory obstacles that inhibit comparative-
effectiveness research. State licensing of insur-
ance andmedical professionals creates barriers
to entry for new, more economical forms of
health care delivery. These regulations particu-
larly burden the types of health plans most
likely to generate comparative-effectiveness
research. Congress should recognize these reg-
ulations for what they are—barriers to trade
among the several states—and use its power
under the Constitution to sweep those trade
barriers away.80
The most promising approach would have
Congress require each state to recognize the
insurance andprovider licenses issuedby other
states. That approach, known as regulatory
federalism, would have a number of salutary
effects.81 It would make basic medical care
more affordable by allowing mid-level clini-
cians to practice to their full competence. It
would generate much greater competition
among insurers, which would drive premiums
downward. It would force insurance regulators
and boards of medicine to compete with their
counterparts in other states to provide the best
balance between quality assurance and access.
It would allow consumers to shop nationwide
for insurance- and provider-licensing protec-
tions, yet it would retain a strong role for local
regulators to enforce those protections and for
local courts to provide quality assurance
throughcontract andmedical-malpractice law.
Finally, regulatory federalism would reduce
barriers to competition for those health plans
(i.e., PGPs) that are most likely to generate
comparative-effectiveness research.
To guarantee competition among regula-
tors,Congressmust itself relinquishany role in
regulating medical professionals or health
insurance. Otherwise, the health care industry
will use federal regulation to block research-
generating health plans, just as the industry
used state regulations for that purpose. Once
those protectionist regulations creep into fed-
eral law, they will be much harder to dislodge.
Unless Congress relinquishes that role, reform
may not be worth the effort.
Conclusion
To economists, the term “public good” is
not a trump card that ends debate over the
merits of a government activity. Advocates of
government-funded comparative-effective-
ness research make the facile assumption
that because such research has public-good
characteristics, government provision would
increase social welfare. In reality, they have no
idea whether the benefits of government pro-
vision would outweigh the costs.
The case for government provision has
many hurdles it must clear. Supporters must
demonstrate (1) that the pursuit of economic
efficiency should trumpany competing values;
(2) that existing government obstacles to pri-
vate provision must be preserved; and (3) that
after taking into account the additional costs
of governmentprovision—the excess burdenof
taxation, the losses due to crowd-out, the
politicization and uncertainty, and the dimin-
ished incentives for theprivate sector to “solve”
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the public-good problem—that the benefits of
government provision would exceed the costs.
Supporters have yet to acknowledge these
issues, much less build that case.
Comparative-effectiveness research is
unlikely to have a serious impact on dubious
medical expenditures, or the growth in med-
ical expenditures, until Congress removes the
perverse financial incentives it has created for
providers. Since replacing those distorted
incentives with market incentives would also
enable markets to boost production of com-
parative-effectiveness information, those
reforms must take center stage.
Appendix
Figure A-1 illustrates how themarket pro-
vides a public good in the absence of govern-
ment intervention. The upward-sloping sup-
ply curve, Sm =MCm, shows the marginal cost
to society of each additional unit of a public
good. The downward-sloping demand curve,
Ds =MVs, shows the marginal value to society
of each additional unit. Because people can
consume public goods without paying for
them, however, we need a second demand
curve, Dp, to represent the amount that con-
sumers are willing to pay for each additional
unit.
To maximize efficiency, producers should
increase production whenever the next unit’s
value to society exceeds that unit’s cost.
Producers should stop onlywhen the value of
the last unit equals its cost. In Figure A-1, the
market-supplied quantity that maximizes
efficiency is represented by Qm*, the point
wheremarginal cost (Sm) equalsmarginal val-
ue (Ds).
Figure A-1 shows that although markets
will produce some quantity of a public good,
they likely will produce less than the efficien-
cy-maximizing amount. The reason is that
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some people will free ride on public goods
purchased by others, because producers can-
not exclude nonpayers. Markets will there-
fore only provide a public good up to the
point where the payers—whose willingness to
pay is represented by Dp—are no longer will-
ing to pay the cost of producing the next
unit. In Figure A-1, that point is represented
by Qm'.
Figure A-1 also illustrates the economic
losses caused by the free-rider problem. The
shaded triangle represents the potential bene-
fits were markets to increase production from
the actual, market-supplied quantity (Qm') to
the optimal, efficiency-maximizing quantity
(Qm*). Equivalently, the shaded triangle shows
the “deadweight economic loss” society suffers
when themarket supplies onlyQm'.
The size of the gap between actual and
optimal market production (Qm*minus Qm')
depends on how well producers can exclude
nonpayers. The better producers are at exclud-
ing nonpayers, the closer the market-supplied
quantity will come to the efficiency-maximiz-
ing quantity. Importantly, the greater the
potential gains from increasing production,
the greater the incentive for producers to find
mechanisms to exclude nonpayers.
The sole justification for government pro-
vision of public goods is to improve econom-
ic efficiency. Equivalently, it is to increase
production such that the benefits outweigh
the costs.
Figure A-2 illustrates the dynamics of gov-
ernment provision. It reproduces the supply
curve for market production of public goods
(Sm) and the demand curve showing the total
value to society of each additional unit of a
public good (Ds). It also reproduces the
efficiency-maximizing quantity when supplied
by the market (Qm*). Figure A-2 omits the
demand curve representing the amount that
consumers are willing to pay for each addi-
tional unit (Dp), though it retains the actual,
suboptimal market-supplied quantity (Qm').
When government supplies a public good,
the relevant supply curve is no longer Sm but
Sg, which represents the total cost of having
government provide each additional unit. The
Sg curve lies above Sm because government
provision incurs the excess burdenof taxation,
which may increase the cost of each addition-
al unit by as much as 100 percent.
It is likely, though not certain, that govern-
ment provisionwill increase the overall supply
of a public good. If so, there will be efficiency
gains. Due to the excess burden, however, the
gains would not be as great as they would be if
markets supplied that increase. In Figure A-2,
Qt(g) represents the total quantity supplied in
the presence of government provision. The
gap between Qt(g) and Qm' represents the net
increase in the quantity supplied. For those
additional units, the efficiency gains are repre-
sented not by the gap between Ds and Sm, but
the gap betweenDs and Sg, shown as the shad-
ed area A.
When government provision crowds out
private provision, it imposes new losses on
society. In Figure A-2, Qm(g)' represents the
market-supplied quantity in the presence of
government provision. Again, Qm' represents
the quantity the market would have supplied
in the absence of government provision. The
difference between those quantities (Qm'
minus Qm(g)') represents the amount of
crowd-out. The shaded area B between Sg and
Sm represents the excess burden associated
with having government provide those crowd-
ed-out units.
An important implicationof the excess bur-
den of taxation is that when government sup-
plies a public good, the efficiency-maximizing
quantity is less thanunder a laissez-faire policy.
In Figure A-2, the efficiency-maximizing quan-
tity is not Qm*, but the (unmarked) intersec-
tion of the Ds and Sg curves. Up until that
point, government can increase efficiency by
adding to themarket-suppliedquantity. If gov-
ernment increases the quantity supplied
beyond that point—for example, if it increases
production to the optimal laissez-faire quanti-
ty Qm*—those additional units would reduce
efficiency, because their cost would exceed
their expected value. The shaded area C repre-
sents those potential losses. By reducing the
efficiency-maximizing quantity of a public
good, the excess burden of taxation makes it
15
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more likely that government would boost pro-
ductionbeyondthatquantity. (Markets are less
likely tocommit that error;private entities tend
not to invest their own resources where costs
exceed expected benefits.)
Figure A-2 shows that the necessary con-
dition for government provision of a public
good to increase efficiency is:
A > B + C
That is, the efficiency gains from increasing
the total supply of a public goodAmust out-
weigh the combined losses due to crowd-out
of private effort B and any government over-
provision C.
Figure A-2 also shows how various parame-
ters affect the likelihood that government pro-
vision will increase efficiency. A large excess
burden reduces the gains fromA and increases
the losses from B and C. A large initial gap
between the laissez-faire quantity (Qm') and the
efficiency-maximizing market-supplied quan-
tity (Qm*) implies smaller losses from B and
larger gains from A. A large degree of crowd-
out implies greater losses from B and smaller
gains from A. A large government investment
increases the likelihoodof losses fromC. If pro-
ducers canpartially exclude nonpayers, such as
bybundlingnonexcludable goodswith exclud-
able goods, that will increaseB and reduceA. If
thegroups interested inapublic goodareorga-
nized and influential, thatwill likely increaseB.
The economic case for government provi-
sion of public goods in general, and compar-
ative-effectiveness information in particular,
is neither obvious nor simple. Analysts who
present it as such do the public a disservice.
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